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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
F o r the purposes of this Brief, the following re fe rences will 
be used throughout. When re fe r r ing to the t r a n s c r i p t of the record , the 
t e r m , ! T r . , ! followed by page and line will be used. 
When re fe r r ing to the pleadings and file sent up from the Dis t r ic t 
Court , the t e r m !IR!I followed by a page number will be used. 
When re fe r r ing to exhibits , the t e r m "exhibit" followed by the 
identifying , !P I ! or , fD l ! and its number will be used. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Respondent here in concurs with the s ta tement of the case 
made in Appellants1 Brief. (See Appellants1 Brief, page 1.) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Respondent here in concurs with the s ta tements in Appellants1 
Brief concerning the disposit ion made in the lower Cour t . (See pages 1 
and 2 of Appellants1 B r i e f . ) 
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants-Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower # 
Court r eve r sed and judgment entered in favor of defendant and further 
relief as appears equitable to the Cour t . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents agree with the s ta tement of facts a s contained 
in Appellants1 Brief, except a s to the following points: 
1) In the yea r 1930 when the f i rs t var iance was granted, the re 
is no evidence as to who owned the p roper ty . Appellants allege at page 
2 of the i r Brief that M r . N. P . Neilson was the owner; this s ta tement is 
not supported by the evidence. 
2) At the top of page 3 of t he i r Brief, Appellants s ta te that when 
his petit ion to the city was granted, "Mr . Nielson was not living on the 
p rope r ty " . Again the evidence doesn ' t sus ta in this s ta tement . Exhibit 
34-D doesn ! t disclose who was living on the proper ty ; however, if he 
wasn ' t , what prompted the Board of Adjustment to state that "an unnessary 
hardship will be suffered by pe t i t ioner" if the var iance is not granted. 
(See page 2 of City Decision, June 20, 1930.) The re ference to the R .95 
to sus ta in this s ta tement is pure boot-s t rapping as R. 95 r e p r e s e n t s 
argument of counsel for the Appellants - - which, of cou r se , is not 
evidence. 
3) With r ega rd to the var iance granted in 1942, Appellants omit 
the fact that the applicant, the Appel lant ' s p r e d e c e s s o r , stated " there will 
be no foundry nor anything that will cause noise and d i s tu rbance" . (See 
page 1 of City finding on June 29, 1942; exhibit 35-D.) F r o m this evidence 
before it, the city granted the va r iance . 
- 2 -
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4) The s ta tement of Appellants on page 4 of the i r Brief indicating 
that in 1950 when Appellant moved in the re was R-2 zoning which p e r -
mitted two-family dwellings, and thus the duplex on 1131 Wilson, is not 
supported in the evidence. Neither exhibit 35-D nor R-29, used by 
Appellants to substantiate this s ta tement , a r e pert inent or re levant . 
However, the re is evidence in exhibit 35-D to indicate that the house on 
1131 Wilson Avenue had been changed from a single dwelling res idence 
to a two-family dwelling without "pe rmi t " or "approval" . (See repor t of 
H a r r y A . Hurley in exhibit 35-D.) 
5) In addition to the facts a s stated at page 5 of Appellants1 
Brief concerning the proper ty at the t ime Appellant purchased it, it should 
be pointed out that the house was vacant, and had been for two to th ree 
months (Tr . page 113, line 27), and that Appellant did extensive r epa i r to 
the house, for which she never obtained pe rmi t s or approval from the ci ty. 
(Tr . page 113, line 12; T r . page 17, line 14.) 
Also, that at the t ime of purchase , the Appellant did not check 
with the city for the non-conforming uses (Tr . page 17, line 15-18), and 
when Appellant r e - r e n t e d the p r e m i s e s as a duplex, she never inquired if 
it was a p roper and conforming use . (Tr . page 114, l ines 4 -6 . ) 
6) Final ly , the s ta tement on page 8 of Appellants1 Brief that 
" there is no evidence in the r ecord of any wri t ten decision from the Planning 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Direc to r or the Chief Building Inspector or any other city official p r i o r 
to the decision of the Board of Adjustment . . . " is just not t r u e . 
Appellants1 own exhibit 35-D contains just such wri t ten decision from the 
City Planning Di rec to r , Vernon F . Jo rgensen . (See l e t t e r in exhibit 35-D 
dated August 15, 1975.) In addition, the r eco rd indicates a s ea r ly a s 
the middle of July, Respondent ' s manager had indication of p roblems on 
the p roper ty . (Tr . page 34, l ines 6-25.) On July 20th, Respondent was 
advised by his manager that the city had informed him that the proper ty 
was being used il legally and would have to be vacated. (Tr . page 35, l ines 
25-27.) 
POINT I 
ALLEGED ERROR OF COURT BELOW IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT MADE 
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, ENTITLING PLAINTIFFS TO RESCIND 
THEIR CONTRACT. 
In i ts Brief, in support of i ts Point I, Appellant makes much 
verbiage concerning the al legation that "Plaintiffs have failed to es tabl ish 
by c l ea r and convincing evidence11 the e lements of fraud. However, 
Appellant doesn' t cite one case in support of he r contention. This i s , no 
doubt, due to the fact that in this jur isdict ion, th is Court has made it 
c l ea r that: 
- 4 -
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The question of whether evidence is sufficient to be 
clear and convincing is primarily for the t r ia l court; 
his finding should not be disturbed unless we must 
say as a matter of law that no one could reasonably 
find the evidence to be clear and convincing, (emphasis 
added) Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P . 2d 
621. 
This rule of law was also followed inCulley v. Culley, Utah 
1965, 404 P . 2d 657, 17 Utah 2d 62, when the Court reiterated: 
Whether evidence is sufficient to meet necessary 
requirements of being clear and convincing is 
largely for t r ia l court to determine because of its 
advantaged position. 
Further, this Court has repeatedly held that it will not disturb 
the findings of the lower Court, except in clearly justified cases: 
Supreme Court will not upset findings of t r ia l 
court unless evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary. Utah 1975, Zions F i rs t National 
Bank v. F i r s t Security Bank of Utah, N.A. , 534 P . 2d 
900. 
Even in equity cases, t r ia l court 's findings and 
judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless evidence 
clearly preponderates against them and a manifest in-
justice or inequity is wrought. (Per Crockett, J . , with 
one judge concurring and two judges concurring in result .) 
Utah 1974, McCullough v. Wasserback, 518 P . 2d 691, 30 
Utah 2d 398. 
In suit in equity, it is duty of Supreme Court to weigh 
facts as well as law, but Supreme Court will reverse 
only if evidence clearly preponderates against findings 
of t r ia l court. Utah 1973, Nelson v. Nelson, 513 P . 2d 
1011, 30 Utah 2d 80. 
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Supreme Court will not disturb findings with respect 
to an equitable plea unless they are clearly against 
weight of evidence. Utah 1972, Achter v. Maw, 493 
P. 2d 989, 27 Utah 2d 149. 
Supreme Court may review facts in equity cases but 
makes allowance for advantaged position of t r ial 
judge and does not disturb his findings and judgment 
merely because it might have viewed matter differently, 
unless evidence clearly preponderates against them 
or he has abused discretion or misapplied law. Utah 
1970, Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P . 2d 430, 24 Utah 2d 378. 
In equitable proceeding, Supreme Court may review 
findings but should not disturb them unless they are 
clearly against weight of evidence. Utah 1969, Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P . 2d 989, 22 Utah 2d 143. 
Supreme Court would sustain findings and determination 
made by tr ial court in equity case unless evidence clearly 
preponderated against them or t r ia l court misapplied 
rules of law. Utah 1963, Weggleland v. Ujifusa, 384 P . 
2d 590, 14 Utah 2d 364. 
It is also the rule of law in this jurisdiction that the findings of 
the t r ia l court are presumed correct , and the burden of proving e r ro r 
falls upon the party alleging it. 
In reviewing proceeding in equity seeking determination 
as to which of two mortgages takes precedence, deference 
is given to prerogative of t r ial court to make findings and 
judgment, and tr ial court is indulged with same presump-
tions of verity accorded in other equitable proceedings. 
Utah 1970, Kemp v. Zions F i rs t Nat. Bank, 470 P . 2d 390, 
24 Utah 2d 288. 
Although action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon which 
reviewing court has both the prerogative and the duty to 
review and weigh the evidence, and to determine the facts, 
t r ia l court 's findings and judgment are presumed correct 
- 6 -
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and appellant has burden to show they were in e r ror ; 
and where the evidence is in conflict, reviewing court 
will not upset t r ia l court !s findings merely because re -
viewing court may have viewed the matter differently, 
but will do so only if evidence clearly preponderates 
against the t r ia l court1 s findings and judgment. Utah 
1972, Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P. 2d 811, 27 Utah 2d 
286. 
Therefore, it would appear from the foregoing that unless the 
lower Court clearly made a serious and blatant e r ro r in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, completely unsubstantiated by the evidence 
or law of the case - - this Court must uphold the decision of the t r ia l 
court. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence does sub-
stantiate the findings and decision of the t r ia l court and an examination 
of it will so prove. 
Respondents agree with Appellants that the requirements laid out 
in Pace v. Parr ish , 122 Utah 141, 247 P . 2d 273 (1952) constitute the yard-
stick for measuring fraudulent misrepresentation in this jurisdiction. 
Therefore, let us examine them: 
1 - THAT A REPRESENTATION WAS MADE CONCERNING A 
PRESENTLY EXISTING MATERIAL FACT, WHICH WAS FALSE. 
The first evidence concerning a representation made concerning 
a presently existing fact appears at Tr . page 25, beginning at Line 10. 
(Mr. Smith is testifying.) 
- 7 -
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He (Defendant's agent) indicated that the shops were 
being utilized under a 1945 nonconforming use permi t 
and I was informed that it would be invalid if the 
p roper ty was vacant for a yea r and a day and that it 
was R-2 zoning which permi t ted a duplex which was 
in front of the p roper ty . f? 
and at line 20: 
,!I inquired as to what uses would be permi t ted for the 
p roper ty if it were vacated in o rde r to conform to the 
yea r and the day use pe rmi t . I was informed that it 
would be utilized for light manufacturing, that t h e r e 
were al l kinds of bus inesses that would be in te res ted 
in utilizing such a facility . . . " 
and at page 26, line 1: 
"We discussed use of the garage and he (Defendants 
agent) indicated that it would make a good paint sp ray 
booth. They a r e always in te res ted in painting c a r s and 
it was a double outside sized garage both in width and in 
height and in debth and would be ideal for such an ope ra -
t ion. !l 
and at page 28, line 29: 
"No, e a r l i e r in the day we talked about the zoning which 
was R - 2 . I was informed that it was R-2 zoning which 
permi t ted the duplex. ! f 
and at page 61, line 2: 
M r . Neilson: Now, it is t rue is it not, that when you 
looked at the p roper ty on Apr i l 7, 1973, you came to 
the conclusion and determinat ion from your examina-
tion of it that t he re had been nothing m i s r e p r e s e n t e d to 
you by M r . Johnson (Defendant's agent) . 
M r . Smith: No, he indicated that the use pe rmi t permi t t 
the use and that the zoning permi t ted the duplex. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and at page 64, line 16 
Mr . Neilson: You knew at the t ime you bought th i s 
p roper ty that it was not zoned for commerc i a l use; 
didn !t you? 
M r . Smith: Yes , s i r . 
M r . Neilson: And that any c o m m e r c i a l use the re would 
have to be in accordance with some nonconforming pe rmi t . 
M r . Smith: The use permi t that M r . Johnson (Defendant's 
agent) told m e . 
M r . Neilson: Well , some kind of nonconforming use p e r m i t ? 
M r . Smith: I was informed that that was the bas is of it, yes 
s i r . 
and at page 74, line 6: 
Q In your conversa t ions with M r . Johnson, did you d i s -
cuss the use of i t ? (the property) 
A Yes , s i r , on the bas is of how the p roper ty in the r e a r 
could be on the R-2 zoning which was , he indicated, p e r -
mitted the duplex. At that t ime he indicated the re was a 
use permi t which was issued in 1945. 
Q What did the use permi t p e r m i t ? 
M r . Nielsen: I object to that on the ground that the use 
pe rmi t would be the best evidence on what it p rovides , 
Your Honor. 
M r . Dodd: But that i sn ' t the evidence. I am asking 
him was the re any discuss ion on the use p e r m i t ? 
The Court : He may answer . 
The Wi tness : Y e s . I was p r i m a r i l y concerned with what 
would happen with the tenants who were vacant which we 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indicated was the basis of having the use permit, and 
he indicated that there could be manufacturing use, and 
a multitude of activities including a paint spray booth in 
the garage which was ideally located for that operation. 
We went into the several kinds of businesses that would 
be able to utilize the stores and the garage should the 
property become vacant. 
and at page 75, line 8: 
(Mr. Dodd) Q. In your discussions with Mr. Barry 
Johnson (Appellant's Agent), did you assert how he 
knew about the zoning? 
A No, I just asked him when he indicated that it was a 
duplex what was the basis of a duplex and he indicated 
R-2 zoning which permitted the duplex and I asked him 
what was the basis of the shops in back and at that time 
he indicated it was a conditional use permit. 
In addition to the above evidence, we have the documentary exhibits 
16-P and 12. P. Exhibit 16-P contains the advertisement which describes 
the property as l!duplex with shops". It also describes a "mechanic's 
garage" and "two-level machine shop". Exhibit 12-P describes the prop-
erty as a "duplex listing" with a "metal shop" and "garage". 
Respondent respectfully points out that by placing the exhibit 16-P 
in the newspaper, the Defendant proclaimed to the world through her 
agent that the uses advertised were proper and legal uses. That as a 
matter of fact, there was a legal duplex on the property that could be used 
as such. That as a matter fact, there was a mechanic's garage on the 
property which could be legally used as such and that as a matter of fact, 
- 10 -
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there was a two-level machine shop and the property could legally be 
used as such. 
Respondent admits that the advertisement does not explicitly 
state that the use permit was obtained and what it permits . But implied 
in the language used is the assurance that the property can be used for 
the purposes stated in the advertisement, and legally so. This must 
be especially true where the advertisement is placed in a newspaper of 
wide circulation calculated to cross state lines. 
Exhibit 12-P again shows the way in which the property was 
described to the profession and again must carry with it the implication 
that the uses of the property stated on the listing are legal and proper, or 
if they are not, then the seller or her agent would have the duty to dis-
close the same. 
The testimony of Mr. Smith clearly shows that he was told that 
the uses on the property were legal and proper. The quotations from the 
evidence above clearly indicate that he was told that the then existing 
uses were legal and proper, that manufacturing was permitted and that 
the duplex was legal under the R-2 zoning. 
However, the facts at the time of the statements, had the Appellant 
taken the bother to find out, were that the duplex was illegal and that 
manufacturing could not be done on the premises, nor was there a mechanic's 
garage which would allow spray painting. The limited commercial use 
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which the law allowed was for a family-operated business. (See exhibit 
10-P and letters from City Planning Director in exhibit 35-D.) The 
duplex was illegal and the use as advertised by the Appellant and as 
represented to the Respondent was totally misleading and improper, and 
at the time the statements were made to Respondent, they were false 
and misleading and at the time the advertisement was placed, it was 
false and misleading and at the time the listing was entered and listed, it 
was false and misleading. Therefore, there can be no doubt that a 
representation was made concerning a presently existing material fact, 
which was false, i .e . , the statements concerning the validity of 
commercial activity on the property and that the nonconforming use 
permit allowed it. Allegedly true statements were made concerning the 
validity of the duplex permitted by the R-2 zoning, when, in fact, the 
duplex had never been permitted and, in fact, was in violation of the 
city ordinances. The statement concerning the mechanics garage 
and the permitability of being able to use the garage as a spray paint 
shop, of course, was false and misleading when made. 
2 - WHICH THE REPRESENTOR EITHER (a) KNEW TO BE 
FALSE, OR (b) MADE RECKLESSLY, KNOWING THAT HE HAD 
INSUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE UPON WHICH TO BASE SUCH REPRE-
SENTATION. - . ' . J <» '•' ' i •- • -
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As will be seen from the t r ansc r ip t , the Appel lant 's agent who 
made the misleading s ta tements did not testify at the t r i a l , although he 
was in Cour t . (Tr . page 4, l ines 7-18.) It appea r s that the Appellant 
elected not to have him testify and, the re fore , t he re i s no direct 
tes t imony as to the knowledge Appel lant 's agent possessed at the 
t ime the misleading s ta tements were made . Therefore , it must be con-
cluded e i ther that (a) Appellant 's agent did not inquire of the city as to 
the validity of the uses on the proper ty and made his s ta tements w r e c k -
less ly , not having sufficient knowledge thereof, or (b) he did inquire 
and knew the uses were not permi t ted and knew his s ta tements to be 
fa lse . In e i ther c a s e , it is submitted that the law would allow recovery 
by the Respondent and does support the decis ion of the t r i a l cour t . 
4 In Brass ford v. Cook, 380 P . 2d 907 (Colo. 1963), the court 
s tated: i',£, .. . J. .; -.<.,.,,,„,, . ...; ,.,>,.,. 
It is t rue that where one seeks r e s c i s s i o n by reason of 1 
mis rep resen ta t ion r a the r than damages , he need not 
- prove that the se l l e r had knowledge of the falsity of 
the represen ta t ion or was ut ter ly indifferent to the i r 
t ru th or falsi ty. 380 P . 2d at 910. 
In LaCourse v. Kiesel , 366 P a . 385, 77 A. 2d 877 (1951), 
defendants engaged a company to se l l t he i r p roper ty . Hand bills that 
adver t i sed the proper ty stated that p roper ty , a s told by defendant, was 
zoned R - 5 , which permi t ted a p a r t m e n t s . Plaintiff read the handbill 
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and decided to purchase and use as income producing property. Upon 
plaintiff's application for title insurance, they learned for the first time 
that zoning restrictions prohibited the use of the property other than as 
a single residence. Plaintiff sued for rescission and return of all 
monies paid. The court held for plaintiffs and the high court affirmed. 
The court commenting on the misrepresentation stated: 
Moreover, whether the selling agent or the owners knew 
that the representation was false has been repeatedly 
held in this jurisdiction to be a matter of no consequence. 
A vendor has no right to make such a statement of which 
he has no knowledge. At page 879. 
In a case similar to the one at bar, involving a city code and years 
of precedented use, defendants were held liable for false statements even 
though innocently made. In Kroninger v. Anast, 116 N.W. 2d 863 (Mich. 
1962), plaintiffs sued for rescission on grounds that defendant had made 
false representations to them that the building could be used for a seven-
family apartment. The defendants had used such building as a seven-
family apartment down through the years . Such use antedated the city 
housing code. Defendants freely admit that they represented to the 
plaintiffs that the property could be used as a seven-family apartment. 
Defendants had no reason to believe otherwise since they and their pre-
decessors in title had used the building as a seven-family apartment 
down through the years without any interference by the city officials or 
otherwise. The local law allowed the city to stop the continued use of 
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the building as a seven-family apartment. The plaintiffs won the case 
and were allowed rescission. The court commenting upon the representa-
tions held that: 
Under these circumstances, the representations of the 
defendant which were relied upon by the plaintiff, were 
false, even though innocently made. Defendants must 
be held responsible for their untrue statements even 
though made in ignorance of their falsity . . . The 
representations even though honestly believed by defen-
dant made out a case of fraud warranting rescission. 
At page 867. 
A variance of five feet concerning a street between the contract 
provisions and the final topographical map of New York City was the 
problem in Goldstein v. Stern, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 816 (1962). The court 
held that: 
If the misrepresentations were innocent a buyer may 
still rescind and sue to recover the consideration 
paid. At page 819. 
In Angela Realty Corp. v. Pavasner Holding Corp. , 236N.Y.S. 
2d 634 (1962), there was a contract of purchase and sale of certain 
commercial property. Plaintiff advised defendant of their intended use 
of the property and inquired whether under existing ordinance such use 
was permitted. Defendant advised that such use was permitted. Before 
closing, plaintiff learned that such intended use would only be permitted 
as a special exception. The court held that: 
Plaintiff being unable to use the premises as intended 
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and which facts were known to the defendants is 
entitled to a rescission. At page 635. 
In Rosenchein v. McNally, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 187 (1962), it was 
held that: 
Even though the representations of a material fact 
was innocently made by defendant and with no intent 
to deceive, plaintiff can still rescind and sue at law 
to recover the considerations paid. Page 189. 
Labasin v. President Realty Holding Corp. , 209 N.Y.S. 2d 
496 (1960), concerned a mistake as to the rentals permissible under 
law concerning certain property. The court held that: 
It is well established that erroneous representations, 
even though innocently made, may justify rescission of 
a consummated contract. Mistake as to a material 
fact may be grounds for a rescission of a contract 
for the sale of land, even in the absence of fraud, 
entitling the purchaser to rescind and recover the 
purchase price. At page 489. 
A case which appears to be directly in point and involves a 
zoning problem is an older case coming from the Pennsylvania District 
and County Reports, Gross v. William Pe nn Fi re Inc. Co . , 51 Penn. 
Dist. & Co. Rpts. 296 (1944). The case involved a suit to recover a 
deposit, and the alleged fraud of defendant through its agent in misrepresent-
ing that the property could be used as a tailor shop. The plaintiff, a 
tailor, had seen a piece of property for sale and went to defendant's real 
estate agent to inquire. Defendant's agent knew plaintiff was a tailor 
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and was looking for a location for a new tailor shop. Defendant's agent 
stated, "As far as I knew, there were no restrictions against a tailor 
shop". The agent called the owner and this was verified. Plaintiff 
paid the deposit, took possession, and discovered that the zoning code 
prohibited the use of the premises for a tailor shop. Plaintiff complained 
to defendant and an endeavor was made to change the zoning law; this 
proved unsuccessful. Plaintiff vacated the premises following ar res t 
for violation of the zoning code. Plaintiff then sued for cancellation of 
the sale and return of the deposit. The court held that a principle is 
liable on misrepresentations of an agent, and then stated: 
The modern concept of the doctrine of fraud and mis-
representation does not necessitate conscious e r ro r 
nor negligence on the part of the person making the 
representation. Page 299. 
The court went on further and held that: 
It is not necessary, in order that a contract may be 
rescinded for fraud or misrepresentation, that the 
party making the misrepresentation should have known 
that it was false. Innocent misrepresentation is suf-
ficient, for though the representation may have been 
innocent, it would be unjust to allow one who has made 
false representation, even innocently, to retain the 
fruits of a bargain induced by such representation. 
The court holding further stated: 
The representation by defendant that the house could 
be used for a tailor shop cannot be classified as an 
opinion. 
and 
If an opinion is falsely and fraudulantly rendered by one 
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professing to have expert skill and special knowledge, it 
is legal fraud. At page 300-301. 
3 - FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING THE OTHER PARTY 
TO ACT UPON IT. 
That Barry Johnson was a real estate agent and was Appellant's 
agent cannot be controverted. (Tr. page 18, line 11; and exhibit 12-P.) 
And that Appellant is liable for the acts and statements of her agent is 
beyond dispute: 
A principle cannot repudiate statements made by his 
agent in the course of the employment, and fairly 
within the line of his real or apparent authority, and 
he is bound by the agent's material representations of 
fact to the same extent as if he had made them him-
self. Am Jur . 2d Vol 3 on Agency Section 264 at page 
629. 
Therefore, the statements made by Appellant's agent, inasmuch 
as he was also a real estate agent, and held himself out to so be (see 
advertisement on exhibit 16-P and exhibit 12-P), could be taken as 
being made by one who was an expert in the area, or at least has superior 
knowledge in real estate matters than the average layman. 
The advertisement contained on exhibit 16-P was placed in the 
newspaper and was worded in such a way so as to induce potential buyers 
to act upon it. That the Respondent was so induced is clear in the evi-
dence, (Tr. page 22, lines 13-29 and page 23, lines 1-20.) for it was 
through the advertisement that Respondent first became aware of the 
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proper ty on 1131 Wilson Avenue, Salt Lake City. Pursuant to th i s , 
Respondent called Appel lant ' s agent and received fur ther s ta tements 
concerning the proper ty , among them the misleading ones concerning the 
uses permi t ted on the p roper ty . (Tr . page 24, l ines 12-30 and page 25, 
l ines 1-30 and page 26, l ines 1-27.) Respondent was induced by this 
conversat ion to make the offer to purchase by t e l e g r a m (see exhibit 17-P 
and 18-P), with a $100.00 ea rnes t money check. Several telephone con-
versa t ions followed th is and Respondent came to view the proper ty on 
Apr i l 7, 1973. (Tr . page 28, l ines 1-3) Again s ta tements were made to 
him concerning the purchase and use of the proper ty , among them some 
misleading ones , and based upon them, he purchased the proper ty and 
took possess ion on June 1st. (Tr . page 28, l ines 6-30; page 29, l ines 
1-30 and page 30, l ines 1-25. See exhibits 1-P through 7 -P . ) 
It is a l so c l ea r that Appel lant ' s agent r epresen ted to Respondent 
that he knew al l the pa r t i cu l a r s on the p roper ty for at T r . page 30, line 
21, the following evidence was obtained: 
(Mr. Dodd) Q. Was the re any conversat ion had at this 
t ime about checking with the ci ty. 
(Mr. Smith) A. No, s i r . He knew the date of the use 
pe rmi t , he knew what could be done with the use permi t , 
he knew how long the proper ty had been rented, he knew 
the zoning, and . . . 
It was upon this a s se r t i on of knowledge, and the s ta tements of 
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A p p e l l a n t s agent that Respondent re l ied and was induced to buy the 
p roper ty . At. T r . page 31, beginning at line 7, we find: 
(Mr. Dodd) Q. Now as a resul t of your conversa t ion with 
B a r r y Johnson, did you take any ac t ion? 
(Mr. Smith) A. Yes , I re l ied upon what he had told m e . 
M r . Nielson: I object to that if the court p lease ; it is 
a conclusion about what he did, and not a factual s t a t e -
ment . 
M r . Dodd: He is entit led to give his t es t imony. 
The Court : The objection will be over ru led . 
(Mr. Smith) A. I re l ied upon what he had told me on 
- the phone in s eve ra l conversa t ions before I came to 
Salt Lake, upon the facts that he p resen ted to me when 
I visited him in his office before I saw the proper ty , 
and upon the facts that he presented to me when I v is i t -
ed the proper ty and again what he told me in re la t ion 
to managing and sell ing the proper ty at the end of 
the two y e a r s when the note to M r s . P e a r m a i n would 
have been paid off. 
F r o m the foregoing, t he re can be no doubt that the s ta tements 
of Appel lant ' s agent were made with a view to inducing Respondent to 
purchase the p roper ty . This was his job, his profess ion and his bus iness 
to se l l th is p roper ty for Appellant. 
4 - THAT THE OTHER PARTY ACTING REASONABLY AND 
IN IGNORANCE OF ITS FALSITY, DID IN FACT RELY UPON IT AND 
WAS THEREBY INDUCED TO ACT: TO HIS INJURY AND DAMAGE. 
The r ecord in th is m a t t e r is c l e a r and uncontrover ted. At 
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T r . page 31, l ines 7-20, we find the following: 
(Mr. Dodd) Q. Now as a resul t of your conversat ion 
with B a r r y Johnson, did you take any ac t ion? 
(Mr. Smith) A. Yes , I rel ied upon what he had told 
m e . 
M r . Nielsen: I object to that if the court p lease , it 
is a conclusion about what he did, and not a factual 
s ta tement . 
M r . Dodd: He is entitled to give his tes t imony. 
The Court : The objection will be over ru led . 
(Mr. Smith) A. I re l ied upon what he had told me on 
the phone in seve ra l conversa t ions before I came to 
Salt Lake, upon the facts that he presented to me when 
I visited him in his office before I saw the proper ty , 
and upon the facts that he presen ted to me when I 
visited the p roper ty . . . 
And even under the c ros s -examina t ion of A p p e l l a n t s counsel , 
it became quite c l ea r that Respondent had believed what A p p e l l a n t s 
agent had rep resen ted to him about the p roper ty . At T r . page 61 , l ines 
2-28, the evidence is as follows: 
(Mr. Nielson) Q. Now, it is t rue is it not, that when 
you looked at the proper ty on Apr i l 7, 1973, you came 
to the conclusion and determinat ion from your examina-
tion of it that t he r e had been nothing rep resen ted to you 
by M r . Johnson? 
(Mr. Smith) A. No, he indicated that the use permi t 
permi t ted the use and that the zoning permi t ted the 
duplex and that the p rope r t i e s were occupied. 
(Mr. Nielson) Q . So that you had no complaint about 
anything he told you up to that t ime ? 
- 21 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Mr. Smith) A. No, s i r . 
(Mr. Nielson) Q . But your r ea son for inspecting the 
p roper ty was that you did not want to take his word 
for what he had said and you wanted personal ly to 
physically examine the p roper ty before you signed 
the ea rnes t money and r e c e i p t ? 
(Mr. Smith) A. No, s i r . 
(Mr. Nielson) Q . What do you mean, no, s i r ? DidnTt 
you want to examine the p roper ty and inspect i t ? 
(Mr. Smith) A. I wanted to examine the proper ty , 
but not because I didn't believe h im. As I explained 
e a r l i e r , it i s difficult over the phone to visual ize what 
the p roper ty was l ike, it was difficult to visualize 
when it had to be painted, what we were talking about 
when we were talking about painting, and it is diffi-
cult to visual ize the ren ta l potential because not know-
ing Salt Lake and exactly where it was located when 
he said it was a dead end s t r ee t so I came out and 
wanted to look the neighborhood over . . . 
Therefore , the evidence of the case is that the Respondent 
believed the rep resen ta t ions of Appel lant ' s agent . The court below 
found that th is belief, re l iance and subsequent purchase by the Respondent 
were r easonab le . (See Conclusion of Law #2 R. page 248.) The evidence 
of the case a lso substant ia tes th is posit ion. It i s uncontroverted that 
the Respondent was a res ident of California (Tr . page 22, line 12), had 
never worked in Utah (Tr . page 42, l ines 22-29), had never purchased 
p roper ty in Utah (Tr , page 44, l ines 17-24), and was not famil iar with 
Utah law or p rocedures for closing purchases of r ea l e s t a t e . 
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On the other hand, it is firmly established that Appellant's 
agent was a real estate agent (see exhibit 12-P) and so held himself 
out to be. This also established that he purported to know what the 
property could be used for and what the zoning allowed. (Tr. page 
30, line 21; Tr. page 21, line 7 supra.) 
It should also be born in mind that when Respondent came to 
inspect the property, it was on Saturday the 7th day of April. (Tr. 
page 28, line 6.) This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that 
the city offices are not open on Saturdays and would not have been 
available had Respondent tried to inquire concerning the uses on the 
property. However, this was not necessary as Respondent believed 
Appellant's agent and relied upon the same, and in light of the relative 
positions of the two, this reliance was reasonable. 
If one cannot believe the advertisements placed in newspapers 
by real estate agents, which are later backed up by oral representations, 
both on the phone and during the inspection of the property, by an agent 
who lives in the area, holds out that he knows the property and its uses, 
then who can any out-of-state buyer rely on? Respondents submit that 
this Court should support the proposition that the real estate agent's 
words should be reliable and that a person relying on this to his damage 
is entitled to rescission. rf > « 
- 23 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
That the Respondents were damaged is uncontroverted in the 
evidence. (Tr. page 40, lines 8-30; page 41, lines 1-30; page 42, 
lines 1-3; also exhibits 22-P and 23-P.) 
From the foregoing, Respondents have amply demonstrated 
that all of the ! ,essential elements" of fraudulent misrepresentation 
have been met under the guidelines of this Court in Pace v. Parr ish , 
(supra). 
For further argument in support of his Point I, Appellant 
states that because the decision of the Board of Adjustment denying 
the uses came after the representations made by Appellants agent, 
this renders his statements true at the time they were made. That this 
is a fallacious argument can be seen from the face of it. The illegal 
uses did not commence when the Respondent took possession of the 
property; but were in existence at the time Appellant's agent was selling 
the property to the Respondent. They were in existence at the time 
when the advertisement was placed and at all t imes thereafter. Respon-
dent did not change the use of the property and was using it for the 
purposes allegedly permissible under the representations made by 
Appellant's agent. However, the City of Salt Lake had never, at any 
time in its determination on this property, stated that it could be used 
for "light manufacturing", a "mechanic's garage", a "two-level 
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machine shop1' for the manufacture of anything, nor had they ever 
approved the home on the property to be used as a "duplex". This is 
what the situation was at the time the Appellant1 s agent was making 
the representations in quotes above. 
Defendants argue at page 10, point #5, of their Biref, that 
statements concerning domestic law are expressions of opinion on 
which no action in fraud will lie. Respondents concede that such a 
general law does exist, but that there are a multitude of exceptions 
to this general rule and that in the case at bar, the statements made 
were not statements of law, but statements of fact. Referring to the 
same section of Am. Jur . as used in Defendants Brief, 37 Am. Jur . 
2d, Fraud & Deceit, Section 73, page 115 (2d Ed. 1968), we find the 
following: 
The American Law Institute takes the position that 
one who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of 
the law for the purpose of inducing another to act 
or refrain from action in reliance thereon in a 
business transaction is liable for the harm caused 
by justifiable reliance thereon; that a statement 
of law may have the effect of a statement of fact 
or of opinion; and that if a representation as to 
a matter of law in a business transaction is a 
representation of fact or a representation of opin-
ion as to the legal consequences of facts known to 
the maker and the recipient or assumed by both to 
exist, the recipient is justified in relying upon 
the former as though it were a representation of 
any other fact, and upon the latter as though it 
were a representation of any other opinion. It is 
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said that the better view now is that a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of law will at least justify 
rescission. 
(Restatement of Torts 525, 545 is in Accord) 
In the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 
264 (1947) relied upon by the Defendant, it was held: 
In the situation confronting us we have other 
circumstances and conditions. We need not go 
into these, as the representation here was one 
of fact (at page 276, col. 1) 
The case dealt with a misrepresentation of fact, and not of law. 
However, in passing, this Court did acknowledge the existence of the 
general rule by saying that: 
That case (Ackerman v. Bramwe 11 Investment Co. , 
80 Utah 52, 12 P. 2d 623, 626) holds as quoted 
by counsel "the general rule is that misrepre-
sentations of law or of the legal effects of 
contracts and writings does not constitute 
remedial fraud. , f There is also, however, the 
following statement which must be given weight. 
"There are exceptions to the rule, or rather 
circumstances or conditions rendering it in-
applicable . . . (Page 276, col. 1) 
In Bobak v. Mackey, 236 P . 2d 626 (Calif. 1951), plaintiff in-
formed defendant that he was looking for a piece of property suitable for 
dwelling and with separate facilities wherein he could also carry on a 
small manufacturing business. Defendant falsely represented to plaintiff 
concerning the property purchased that: (1) plaintiff could lawfully carry 
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c a r r y on his manufacturing business on the p r e m i s e s , and (2) that the 
proper ty was zoned for light manufacturing, including plaintiff1 s 
bus iness . Whereas , the p roper ty was zoned such that no manufacturing 
was allowed at a l l . The plaintiff re l ied on such mis rep resen ta t ions of 
the defendant. The court comments upon what is a represen ta t ion of 
law and of fact and s ays : 
Appellant contends that the mi s rep re sen ta t ion charged 
against him in the complaint . . . a r e at most r e p r e -
sentat ions of law and not of fact, and hence no cause 
of act ion was stated . . . F o r r easons stated we see 
no mer i t in the contention. ^: 
Continuing, the court s tated: 
The represen ta t ion was not a mere represen ta t ion of 
law, i . e . , the classif icat ion made by the law, but of 
the fact that the p roper ty lay within a zone of a p a r t i -
cu lar cha rac t e r , that is which the law had cha rac te r i zed 
as R-3 r a the r than C-2 . Manifestly, the r e p r e s e n t a -
tion was of fact and not mere ly one of law. 263 P . 2d 
at 627. 
In Greene v. Humphrey, 274 P . 2d 535 (Okla. 1954), the s t a t e -
ment that the pe rson held f!a one-year l ease t ! was held to be a s t a t e -
ment of fact and not of law. 
In Gould v. Escondido Valley Poul t ry A s s ' n . , 133 P . 2d 448 
(Calif. 1943), the s ta tement concerning the depth of top soil was a 
m a t e r i a l s ta tement of fact and not "puffing" or "opinions'1 . 
In Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trus t C o . , 134 A. 2d 761 ( N . J . 
1957), the court held that : 
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Although ordinarily expressions of opinion may not 
be relied upon, the rule is otherwise where the 
opinion is given by one who has succeeded in securing 
the confidence of the victim, or holds himself out 
as having special knowledge of the matter, or pur-
ports to be disinterested. 
InRusch v. Walde, 232 N.W. 875 (Wise. 1930), the court stated 
that: 
It is not universally true that a misrepresentation 
of the law is not binding upon the party who makes 
it. Where one who has had superior means of infor-
mation, professes a knowledge of the law, and there-
by obtains an unconscionable advantage over another 
who is ignorant and has not been in the situation to 
become informed, the injured party is entitled to r e -
lief as well as if the misrepresentation had been 
concerning a matter of fact. At page 876. 
The argument on pages 11 through 17 of Appellant's Brief is 
simply argument to t ry and get this Court to reverse the decision of 
the Board of Adjustments of Salt Lake City. Respondent respectfully 
suggests that that issue is not before this Court; Appellant tried the 
same argument to the Court below without success. However, in the 
event this Court decides to follow Appellant's argument, it should be 
pointed out: 
(A) Appellant claims because the property had been used by 
an absentee owner for 25 years in violation of the use permit, that this 
made the uses proper and conforming. (See page 12 of Appellants' Brief.) 
The law does not support this proposition. (See Gross v. William Penn. 
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F i r e In s . , and Kroninger v. Anast , s u p r a . ) Common sense and equity 
don't support it e i the r . Doing a wrong for 25 y e a r s doesn ' t make it r ight . 
(B) The Appellant makes r e fe rences to comments of the t r i a l 
court on the decision of the Board of Adjustments ' decision. Respondents 
respectfully point out that these a r e only comments and as ides of the 
Judge and only r ep re sen t dictum. They a r e nowhere found in the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s F i n d i n g s of Fac t and Conclusions of Law. Therefore , they c a r r y 
no weight at a l l . In addition, the t r i a l court c l ea r ly refused to follow 
Appel lant ' s Red Her r ing , and said in response to the question as to 
whether it could rule on the Board of Adjustments decision, MNo, I can ' t 
make it because I have very incomplete f a c t s . " (Tr . page 135, l ines 7-8. ) 
POINT II 
ALLEGED DUTY OF PLAINTIFFS TO INQUIRE AS TO USE BEFORE 
PURCHASE. 
Respondent admits that he was told by Appel lant 's agent that the 
proper ty was being used under a nonconforming use permi t and that the 
duplex was the re pursuant to R-2 zoning which permi t ted the duplex. 
Respondent a l so admi ts that he is employed in City Management; but the 
evidence doesn ' t show that he knew any more about zoning and use pe rmi t s 
than an average man would know. He had never studied it in school. 
(Tr . page 43, l ines 14-24.) However, he was general ly aware ffthat if a 
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pa r t i cu l a r a r e a was zoned for one use that it couldn !t be used for another 
purpose unless the re was some kind of var iance g ran ted" . (Tr . page 44, 
l ines 4 -6 . ) The average man on the s t ree t knows that . He knew that 
" ce r t a in sect ions of the city were zoned for res ident ia l purposes as 
compared to c o m m e r c i a l and other purposes1 1 . (Tr . page 43, line 30; 
page 44, l ines 1-2.) The average man on the s t r ee t knows that . In fact, 
t he re is no evidence before th is court that Respondent had any bet ter 
knowledge about zoning or use pe rmi t s in Utah than the average man. 
Indeed, the evidence denies the argument put forth by Appellants at page 
18 of their Brief that Respondent had a famil iar i ty and specia l knowledge 
of the public r e c o r d s a n d / o r zoning. Beginning at T r . page 73, line 
23, we find the following: 
(Mr. Dodd) Q. M r . Smith, has your occupation eve r dealt with 
! zoning? 
A. No, s i r . q 
Q. Has it eve r dealt with use p e r m i t s ? 
r A. No, s i r . 
Q. Has it eve r dealt with v a r i a n c e s ? 
A. No, s i r . -
In addition to having no specia l knowledge of zoning, use pe rmi t s 
a n d / o r va r i ances , Respondent had never before purchased p roper ty in 
Utah. (Tr . page 74, l ines 4-5 . ) And even if Respondent had some genera l 
knowledge about use pe rmi t s in California, it would not have given him 
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any special knowledge about the use permit on Wilson Avenue in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. When the facts are compared and equity is applied, 
it becomes obvious that Appellant had the duty of discovering and disclosing 
the city's position on the property purchased. The facts are as follows: 
Respondent Appellant 
1. Out of town In town resident 
2. Not in real estate business Bona-fide Real Estate Agent; lived in 
town 
3. Came to town on Saturday, City offices available anytime during 
no city offices open day 
4. Saw advertisement in news- Placed advertisement in newspaper with 
paper with representations representations 
5. Was told that existing uses Told buyer that existing uses were 
and others were permitted permitted 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that Appellant's agent had the 
best opportunity and indeed, duty, to ascertain the true permissible uses 
of the property, before placing the advertisement in the paper and before 
making representations to Respondent. That he did not was wreckless, 
and with complete disregard to the rights of Respondent. 
The claim by Appellant that Respondent had a duty to check the local 
law is not founded in the law. In fact, the law indicates that one in a 
superisor position, such as Appellant's agent, had the duty to ascertain 
the facts. > f H 
- 31 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Barder v. McClung, 209 P. 2d 808 (Calif. 1949), plaintiffs 
sued for damages based on fraud in the purchase in 1946 of a residence 
with a detached garage containing a dwelling unit, which unit was being 
maintained and used in violation of zoning ordinances. Defendants r e -
presented that property was improved with two dwelling units, and that 
plaintiffs could occupy one of them as their own and lease the other unit. 
In 1943, defendants altered the residence knowing it was in violation of 
the zoning ordinances. Concerning duty to inquire, the court held that: 
An independant investigation or an examination of 
property does not preclude reliance on representation 
where the falsity of the statement is not apparent 
from an inspection, or the person making the repre -
sentation has a superior knowledge, or the party 
relying thereon is not competent to judge the facts 
without expert assistance. At page 811. 
The court also held that: 
Neither can it be said the plaintiff was bound by 
constructive notice of the zoning ordinances. At page 
811. 
The court in Blackman v. Howes, 185 P . 2d 1019 (Calif. 1947), 
held that one is justified in relying if they do in fact rely, and this is 
not destroyed because means or knowledge were opened to them. 
The court inMulkey v. Morr is , 313 P . 2d 494 (Ckla. 1957), held 
that: 
One who relies upon a false, material representation 
is not precluded from recovering damage for his 
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det r iment , because of the fact that he did not investigate 
the veraci ty of the represen ta t ion . At page 500. 
Plaintiff in Hardin v. Hill, 423 P . 2d 309 (Mont. 1967), was 
allowed to r ecove r because of de fendan t s mi s rep resen ta t ion . The court 
held that the mi s r ep re sen ta t i on "was entit led to consti tute fraud, even 
though p u r c h a s e r s co-authored the defect by lack of investigation11 . 
The court in Suit v. Bolenback, 327 P . 2d 1023 (Ariz. 1958), held 
that f twhere only a pa r t i a l investigation is made, and a par ty r e l i e s in par t 
upon the represen ta t ions and is deceived by such rep resen ta t ions , the 
act ion (for resc i ss ion) may be mainta ined" . The court in Lanning v. 
Sprague, 227 P . 2d 347 (Idaho 1951), held that : 
Plaintiff1 s right to r ecover damages cannot be defeated 
by showing that plaintiffs by making an independent in-
vestigation could have ascer ta ined the falsity of the 
r ep resen ta t ions . At page 350. 
In Spencer v. Nelson, 238 P . 2d 169 (Calif. 1952), the court 
held: 
It is only where the par ty defrauded should plainly have 
discovered the fraud except for his own inexcusable in-
attention that he will be charged with the d iscovery in 
the advance of actual knowledge on his pa r t . At page 178. 
The court in Richard v. Baker , 297 P . 2d 674 (Calif. 1956), held 
that plaintiff had no good r eason to doubt the veraci ty of defendant or the i r 
agent, that they did not independently check the s ize of the lot, nor were 
they requi red to do so . They were entitled to re ly upon the represen ta t ions 
made . 
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In Stevens v. Marco, 305 P. 2d 669 (Calif. 1956), the court held 
that: 
Fur thermore, where one is justified in relying, and does 
in fact rely, upon false representations, his right of 
action is not destroyed merely because opportunities 
for examination or means of knowledge were opened to 
him where no legal duty devolved upon him to employ 
such means of knowledge. At page 682. 
In Regus v. Schartkoff, 319 P . 2d 721 (Calif. 1957), the court 
held: 
Where fraud is involved, public record are not construc-
tive notice of the true facts to the defendant party. At 
page 726. 
In Carrel v. Lux, 420 P . 2d 564 (Arizona 1966), the court held 
that: 
Representations such as that may be said to have been 
calculated to lull the buyers of the property into the 
belief that they were true and to cause them to 
refrain from making a more extensive investigation. 
In such a situation, the buyer should not be prevented 
from recovering by a failure to investigate. At page 
570. 
In Fox v. Wilson, 507 P . 2d 252 (Kan. 1973), the court held that 
it was no defense to claims of vendorfs misrepresentation of facts con-
cerning ranch property that the purchaser should have inspected the 
entire property before they purchased and should not have relied upon 
the representation. 
In Investors Equity Exchange, Inc. , v. Whitely, 524 P . 2d 1211 
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(Ore, 1974), the court held that the defendant should not be allowed 
to avoid the obvious misrepresentations by stating that plaintiff should 
have found out they were not telling the truth. Moreover, the plaintiff 
relied on defendant's statements and did not conduct any independent 
investigation. 
InBoons t rav . Stevens-Norton, Inc. , 393 P. 2d 287 (Wash. 1964), 
the court held that: 
Where misrepresentation actually deceived and misled 
a party, and here they did, it is immaterial that pro-
per investigation would reveal the truth. At page 290. 
The court in LaCourse (Supra) held that: 
So also we have repeatedly held there is no obligation 
on the part of the purchasers to examine public records 
before purchase. The material misrepresentation of 
an existing fact confers on the party who relies on it 
the right or not, especially where as here they had 
means of knowledge from which they were bound to 
ascertain the truth before making the representations. 
At page 880. 
Stallard v. Adams, 228 S.W.2d 430 (Kentucky 1950), concerned 
a suit for rescission based on fraudulant representation in a land contract. 
Defendant Stallard represented to plaintiff that a certain lot contained no 
restrictions as to use of such lot for the sale of beer. There was, 
however, restrictions limiting the lot to residential purposes. Plaintiff 
sued and won and the court held that: 
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The fact that appel lees could have gone to the r e c o r d s 
and learned what were t he i r r e s t r i c t i ons concerning 
this p roper ty does not prevent them from prosecut ing / f 
th is act ion against appel lants for deceit by r ea son of 
the mi s r ep re sen t a t i ons Stallard knowingly made to 
Adams rela t ive the re to , where Adams was ignorant 
of what the r e s t r i c t i ons w e r e . At page 432. 
DiCarlo v. Pacan i a s , 1 6 4 F . S u p p 8 4 1 ( E . D . La . 1958) aff'd, 
266 F . 2d 656 (5th C i r . 1959), involved a suit by p u r c h a s e r s against 
r e a l t o r s and vendors . The zoning ordinances permi t ted only a two-
apar tment s t r u c t u r e , and defendants r ep resen ted that t h r ee apartme nts 
were allowed. The court held that : , J 
There was no duty on the par t of plaintiff to inquire 
a s to the zoning c lass i f ica t ion of the p r e m i s e s . They 
had a right to re ly on the war ran ty of the vendor 
and the r e a l t o r s . At page 843. 
In Judson (Supra), the court held that : "fc 
At any r a t e , one who p e r p e t r a t e s a fraud may not 
urge that his v ic t im should have been more c i r c u m -
spect or a s tu te . At page 766. 
F u r t h e r , in B a r d e r v. McClung (Supra), the court held: 
Purpose of the recording ac t s is to afford pro tec t ion 
not to those who make fraudulant r ep resen ta t ions , but 
to bona-fide p u r c h a s e r s for value. " - > ' • • > 
There fore , Appellant cannot hide behind the fiction that Respondent 
should have checked out the law, and had a duty to do so, which not being 
done, now prec ludes him from recove ry . This is especia l ly t rue where 
the evidence c lea r ly shows that Appellant hersel f did not do so when she 
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purchased the property and thus, by her own actions, perpetrated the 
illegal uses on the property. (Tr. page 17, lines 14 and 18; page 113 
and 114; page 21, lines 18-22.) Thus, Appellant would urge this court 
to place upon Respondent a s tr icter standard of care than she herself 
exercised at her time of purchase, or that her agent exercised at the 
time of his sale. In either case, had the Appellant inquired of the city 
as to the permissable uses, this case would not have occurred. 
In the single case relied upon by Appellants, i . e . , Scott v. 
Wilson, 15 111. App.2d 456, 146 N.E.2d 397 (1957), the court there held 
that the actions of the seller were representations of law. Also, it held 
that the purchaser had equal opportunity to avail himself of the local law, 
and, therefore, should have done so. There are no findings in the case 
as to whether or not the seller worked through a real estate agent, or 
whether the purchaser was from out of town. The inference is that the 
two parties to that case were on equal ground, and that the seller only 
made statements concerning the law. Thus, the case is distinquishable 
and based on a different set of facts. It is interesting to note that the 
Scott (Supra) case held: 
Equity will afford relief on ground of fraud and 
misrepresentation only where parties do not 
have equal knowledge or means of knowledge of 
facts represented. At page 398. 
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Hence, the inference in the Scott case, (Supra) was that there 
was equality between the parties with regard to knowledge and assessability 
to knowledge. This, of course, is not true in the case at bar where the 
purchaser is not a real estate agent, does not live in Utah, has not 
purchased property in Utah before, and does not have ready access 
to the city ordinances for review; especially where all of the foregoing 
is known to the seller, and the seller holds himself out as one who knows 
what the facts a r e . f 
In addition to the foregoing, the statements made in the case at 
bar were statements of fact, not of law, and under the case law enumerat-
ed above, the lower court was correct in so finding. The statement that 
a property may be used in such a fashion or be put to such a use is a 
statement of fact and not of law, as the cases, supra, already brought 
to this court 's attention have demonstrated. « 
Further , in the Scott case, supra, there were no actual state-
ments made by the seller, but merely conduct, i . e . , they were renting 
a basement apartment. This, that court found to be insufficient evidence 
to prove fraud. How different in the case at bar where affirmative state-
ments of fact, and alleged knowledge of the seller were made. 
Therefore, the Respondents respectfully maintain that the 
duty to find out the correct uses of the property was upon the seller through 
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her agent. The law so holds, the equity of this case so holds and the 
superior position of the Appellant's agent to the information plus his 
experience as a real estate agent would so hold. And if this court is 
not willing to impose such a duty upon the seller through her agent, 
then at least it should be his duty that he not make statements wreck-
lessly, when he has not true knowledge of them. 
POINT III 
ALLEGED WAIVER OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RESCIND AND 
ALLEGED RATIFICATION OF ANY WRONG BY DEFENDANT. 
Appellants cite no case or statutory authority whatsoever for 
this point. They have mistaken the rule that one must exhaust one's 
administrative remedies before resort to the courts. This is not the 
case at bar. This case does not involve Respondent's attempt through 
court to reverse the decision of the Board of Adjustment. This case is 
simply a suit against Appellants for misrepresentation and rescission 
of the contract. Even though Appellants have been mistaken there is 
some case authority and it goes against them. 
In Dolan v. DeCapua, 80 A. 2d 655 (N.J. 1951), the court held: 
The court rule requiring exhaustion of remedies 
before issuance of perrogative writs was not appli-
cable to proceedings to review grant of permit 
for erection of garage contrary to zoning ordinances, 
where appeal to Board of Adjustment had been taken 
and dismissed. At page 656. 
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In Peninsula Corp. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the 
Town of New Fairfield, 183 A. 2d 271 (Con. 1962), plaintiff sold lots 
to individuals, who were denied building permits because defendant 
claimed that plaintiff had not filed a map of its property as a subdivision. 
Plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment whether its property was a 
subdivision. The lower court stated that plaintiff was not entitled to 
seek a declaratory judgment whether its property was a subdivision. 
The lower court stated that plaintiff was not entitled to seek declaratory 
judgment "until it had appealed the action of the zoning and planning 
board to the zoning board of appeals and said board had acted and when 
its plaintiff1 s rights had thus become complete and final11. The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut held otherwise and stated: 
A tr ia l court, in its conclusion, holds that an application 
has to be filed by the plaintiff with the planning commis-
sion to determine whether the property is a subdivision 
and that the matter must be decided by the planning 
commission before the plaintiff can have recourse to 
the courts. We find no such requirement in the 
statutes. At page 272. (Emphasis added) 
The court went on and held that the property owner was not 
required to file with the planning and zoning commission of the town 
an application to determine whether property was subdivided before 
seeking determination of that issue by the courts. 
In Scoville v. Ronalter, 291 A. 2d 222 (Con. 1971), the court 
held that: 
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It is one of the claims of defendants that the 
plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment because they 
failed to pursue statutory right of appeal to the 
Bristle zoning board of appeals. We cannot say 
that under the particular and unusual circumstances 
of this case that the plaintiffs as a matter of law 
were precluded from taking the action they did. 
At page 226. 
In Wiercioch v. Village of Niles, 189 N. E. 2d 278 (111. 1963), there 
was an action to declare invalid a municipal dwelling zoning ordinance as 
applied to the lots surrounded on all sides by s t reets . The court held 
that: 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs were barred because 
they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
We do not think the rule requiring first resort to 
administrative remedies goes as far as defendant 
urges. The reason for the rule is to give the munici-
pal authorities an opportunity to correct invalid 
regulations before becoming involved in litigation. 
At page 280. 
InQ'mara v. City of Newark, 48 Cal Rptr. 208 (1966), the court 
held that: 
Thus, when an owner claims that he has a right to 
an existing nonconforming use, he is not required to 
apply for a variance or use permit before resorting to 
the course for relief from an attempted termination 
of such nonconforming use. At page 211. 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that Respondent had no duty 
at law or equity to seek the determination of the Board of Adjustment 
prior to bringing his action. That he did so, in an effort to uphold and 
- 41 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determine the validity of his contract with Appellant cannot be used 
against him, as Appellants try to argue. To so hold would deter any 
person with a similar problem from seeking self-help measures to 
resolve problems without going to the courts* 
Respondent finds no law to support the proposition that because 
he sought the solution of his dilemma through the Board of Equalization 
first, he was thereby precluded from recourse to the courts. The 
language of the court below relied upon by Appellant is, of course, dictum 
and is not found in the court 's Findings; therefore, has no weight in law. 
Appellant argues that we should have appealed the Board of 
Adjustment decision to the courts, and that this was our exclusive remedy. 
However, Appellants do not state why this is the Respondents exclusive 
remedy and particular burden. The facts indicate that the Appellant still 
owns an interest in the property. (See exhibits 26-D; 7-P; 6-P; 5-P; 
4-P; 3-P; 2-P; and 1-P.) She had notice of the hearing before the 
Board of Adjustments and wrote a letter to them as she could not attend. 
(See page 2 of exhibit 10-P.) Hence, Appellant was equally bound by 
the decision of the Board of Adjustments. Why isnft it just as much 
incumbent upon the Appellant to appeal the decision of the Board as the 
Respondent? In fact, Respondent represents to this Court that the 
equitable solution to this matter is to allow the Appellant to bring her 
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case to the courts if she wishes. But, we cannot hear her case 
now. 
In E lde r v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379 384 P . 2d 802 at page 804, 
th is court held: 
The fact that the E lde r s indicated an intention 
to t r y to make good on the contract immediate ly 
after learning the facts, under these c i r cums tances , 
does not preclude them from changing the i r minds 
and rescinding the contract short ly the rea f t e r . 
Nor does the fact that the Clawsons sold the i r 
contract and one of the houses which they received 
the reon prevent a r e s c i s s i o n and r ecovery . 
This ca se , of cou r se , involved the sale of land which E lde r s 
were allowed to resc ind because s e l l e r s had not advised them of a 
quarant ine on the proper ty . Sel lers had said the re were weeds, but not 
a quarant ine . Note that th i s court did not hold that because s e l l e r s 
mentioned the re were weeds that pu rchase r was put on notice and should 
have found out about the quarant ine . However, the important rule of law 
i s , of cour se , that th is Court will allow a par ty t ime to t r y and make 
the bargain go - - as Respondent t r i ed to do in the case at ba r . 
Thus , the Respondent cannot be ba r r ed from seeking a judicial 




 •'•'• ~ * ^ CONCLUSION 
The Respondent wishes to r e i t e r a t e ce r ta in points which the 
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evidence and law of this case make clear: 
1 - The tr ial court, which is in the best position to judge 
the evidence, found for the Respondent. 
2 - The decision of the t r ial court will not be overturned 
unless its decision is clearly not supported by the evidence and blatant 
e r ro r has been commited. 
3 - Appellant has failed to establish any such grounds for 
e r ro r and reversal . 
4 - This Court cannot hear or retry the decision of the Board 
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City which is what Appellants want the Court 
to do. 
5 - There were misrepresentations made concerning the per-
mitted uses of the property which were false when made. 
6 - These were made by Appellants agent and, therefore, 
Appellant is bound by them. 
7 - Respondent was induced to act and reasonably relied upon 
them to his damage. 
8 - Therefore, the decision of the t r ia l court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gfaham Dodd * 
Attorney for Respondents 
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I hereby certify that on the 13th day of November, 1975, 
I se rved two copies each of the foregoing brief by del ivering same 
to Ar thu r N. Nielson and Randall L . Romre l l , of Nielson, Conder , 
Henroid & Gottfredson, a t torneys for Appellants , 410 Newhouse Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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